Recently, there was a screenshot in which you and a community member discussed nodes. In the conversation, you said you planned to build 10+ nodes as stand-by nodes. Since the screenshot was captured without context, the community created several different versions of your intentions behind this statement. Could you explain what you meant?

Yipeng SuI was quite surprised when I learned how the screenshot was discussed in the community the next day. I thought it was just a private chat between friends.

It’s not a big deal, though. There is nothing we can’t share. I had an idea of setting up 10+ nodes. Of course, it is only an idea, and it is still immature. The original intention is two-fold:

First, I want to understand through experience. I’d like to understand the advantages and disadvantages of the Supernode election process by actually being part of it so that I know how to improve the system later. Secondly, I was concerned that the number of stand-by nodes was insufficient, which affects the stability of the blockchain.

I’ve noticed that the English translation of the word “candidate” is wrong. It should be “stand-by,” but it was translated into “candidate”. The meaning completely changes. It’s no wonder that it caused misunderstandings in English-speaking communities. Even if I really had 10+ nodes, I wouldn’t compete with the community to solicit votes. I just need to be in the top 96. It is more for technical purposes than for economic reasons.

If owning 10+ is to provide a safety net in case of insufficient number of DPoS nodes, are these nodes under the name of the Elastos Foundation or of you? Who will be responsible for the cost and entitled to the profit? Is there a well-defined plan for these 10+ nodes to cease when there are enough community nodes?

As I mentioned earlier, this is just an idea. It is all personal, and has nothing to do with the team at Elastos. Therefore, if the nodes are to be built, it is in a personal capacity, and thus the cost and the profit have nothing to do with the Foundation. Moreover, I guess it is impossible to profit if there is no advertising.

Regarding the exit mechanism, I haven’t planned for such a distant future. These nodes are mainly for observing the operation of the Supernodes and they may quit at any time.

As a member of the community, you have the right to be elected, but as one of a small minority of rule-makers within CR, to a certain extent there could be a conflict of interest if you run in the election. How do you consider this when formulating election rules? Is there a mechanism to minimize conflicts of interest?

As you said in your question, the fact that I haven’t participate in the actual Supernode elections so far does not mean that I give up the rights I have to participate at some point.

DPoS is a well-known consensus mechanism, and I should not be seen as a rule maker. Consensus is open and transparent to the community and embedded in the program codes. If one day I really want to participate in the Supernode election, I will certainly follow the consensus rules that are open and transparent to everyone. In the world of blockchain, no one has the privilege [to be above the rules].

Members of the community have expressed that the 1-ELA-for-36-votes mechanism, compared with the 1-ELA-for-1-vote mechanism makes the rich (with way more ELA at hand) more equipped to dominate the election with the same number of ELA. The first mechanism allows the rich to gain higher node positions, and indirectly leads to the emergence of alliances to maximize benefits. The 1-ELA-to-1-vote mechanism is very common and does not magnify the power of the rich or the alliances. Can you explain what benefits the 1-ELA-for-36-votes mechanism can bring and how to deal with the drawbacks including the ones mentioned above? How do you see this mechanism shaping and influencing decentralized community operations?


Every coin has two sides. It is difficult to have a perfect solution. 1-ELA-for-36-votes mechanism is beneficial to the establishment of stand-by nodes. This is the first thing we must consider to ensure the smooth operation of the DPoS consensus. This is for the common interest of the whole community. Other matters can be considered after this foundation.

In addition, fairness is relative. We can’t be fair in all aspects, which is why we have the CRC in place. This is the next most important milestone after DPoS. Community affairs are decided by community consensus; if you think there are some problems in the design of the DPoS mechanism, you can propose a more effective solution and let all token holders decide together after the CRC is officially launched.

You mentioned that it is a good thing to have some rich people participate in the election. Can you explain this in more detail? Is this related to the design of the voting mechanism? Nodes are not required to lock their rewards, and there is no restriction to prevent the rich from selling their tokens. For them, they are getting node rewards without additional cost. What do you think of the impact this has on the consensus mechanism?


I can’t remember if I have said this before. If I have said it, there probably is some important context to it. At present, it is unlikely that these undertakings of the rich will happen because no one knows how much ELA is required for this purpose. The stances of rich people are not necessarily the same. On the contrary, the possibility of healthy competition is greater.

For DPoS consensus, the more decentralized the distribution of tokens, the more fairness there will be. However, it takes time to achieve this. In the short term, to an ELA holder, both rich or an ordinary investor, it is wiser to hold the tokens for the election rather than speculation (both are use-cases of ELA). If someone wants to achieve the effect of manipulating the elections, they need to buy a lot of tokens which is a huge risk. This is probably the context of why I say it is a “good thing”. It is kind of teasing the possibility.

In addition, I disagree with the notion of “getting node reward without additional cost”. Supernode elections are not only an activity that community members participate in for consensus; it as also an investment. The ELA paid is the cost.

Finally, I want to say that no matter what the consensus is, the more participants there are, the more fairness there is. Therefore, expanding the community and developing the dapp ecology is the highest priority. We designed the CRC to make the community more attractive; we have built the technology infrastructure step-by-step in accordance with the whitepaper to facilitate the creation of dapps. However, the development of Elastos must not rely solely on the Elastos Foundation. Let us all work together.


Please enter your comment!
Please enter your name here